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LIGHT IN THE DARKNESS?
REFLECTIONS ON ELEONORE STUMP’S THEODICY
William Hasker

Eleonore Stump’s Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering
is a major contribution to the literature on the problem of evil. This review
essay summarizes the overall argument of the book, pointing out both merits and difficulties with Stump’s approach. In particular, the essay urges objections to the solution she presents for the problem of suffering.

Seven years in the writing, and many more years in preparation, Eleonore
Stump’s Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering1 is a book
that is both massive and masterful. The work deploys an extraordinary
range of resources: philosophy, theology, and scripture, but also psychology
and neuroscience as well as a multitude of references from biography and
literature. Given this wealth of material, a critical comment such as this one
must of necessity be highly selective. I will proceed by way of a brief summary and comment on each of the four main sections of the book.
I. Task and Method
What is needed, Stump says, is a justification for God’s allowing suffering. This question has often been addressed by means of theodicies, and
Stump spends some time discussing the theodicy project. She addresses
quite effectively the objections that have become current to the very idea
of theodicy. One important objection, urged by Terence Tilley among others, is that “theodicies are immoral because they blind us to the horror of
evil, and they make us comfortable with suffering we might otherwise
strive against” (16). Let it be said once and for all: Stump is not vulnerable
to this charge. She writes with passionate eloquence about the severity
of human suffering, and she never lets us forget the awfulness of that for
which we are seeking a justification. Her search for a solution to the problem is energized precisely by her sense of the great evils involved in the
suffering that, nevertheless, God permits.2 One may disagree with some
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010. Page references are to this volume.
Later on she states, “Human suffering is appalling, and the horror of the whole of it
has to be faced. But there is more than one way of facing suffering, and consigning those
who suffer to the scrapheap of human history is not the only way to respect their suffering” (456).
1
2
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or all of the solutions she proffers, but the charge of minimizing or evading the reality of evil gains no purchase against her.
Having thus defended the propriety of theodicy, she takes an apparent
step backwards and states that her own project is, strictly speaking, not a
theodicy but a defense. Now the distinction between theodicy and defense
has become common since it was introduced by Plantinga, but as yet there
is no single, generally recognized explication of the difference between the
two. She states that she is “construing ‘defense’ roughly in Plantinga’s and
Van Inwagen’s way” (491n), but this fails to clarify matters, because the two
men actually have somewhat different understandings of the notion. So
we must look for clarification to what Stump herself says about it. In some
respects, her explanations are clear enough. A theodicy presents to us a
view of the world which elucidates the general nature of God’s reasons
for permitting suffering to occur, and claims that this is the way the world
actually is. (This need not and should not involve a claim to discern the
reasons for particular instances of suffering, which in many cases are unavoidably obscure to us.) A defense, however, presents to us a picture of a
possible world in which God has adequate reasons for permitting the sorts
of suffering that occur in our world, but does not include the claim that
this possible world is our actual world. That is to say, it presents possible
morally sufficient reasons for God’s permitting evil, but makes no claim
that these are the actual reasons. Even an atheist, then, may be able to admit
that a given defense is successful—that is, she may admit that if there were
a God, the sorts of considerations adduced might explain how God could
permit evils without being morally compromised thereby. A defense does
not, however, include the assertion that the world thus described is not the
actual world, so it is open to a believer to conclude that the world of the
defense is actual and that the reasons given in it are really God’s reasons.3
So far this is clear enough. An ambiguity arises, however, when we
ask: what are the epistemic requirements for a successful defense? Is it
required only that the world of the defense be logically possible? If so,
then the defense will be successful only against the charge that God and
evil are logically incompatible, and that is a charge that is seldom pressed
3
For several reasons, I find this way of explicating the difference less than satisfactory.
There is the epistemic ambiguity that is discussed below in the text. There is also a practical difficulty, in that these definitions will tend to have the result of eliminating theodicy:
philosophers will tend to avoid making the more ambitious claim, to have discerned God’s
actual reasons, when the more cautious project of defense offers almost all of the same
benefits. I do not believe that a theodicy needs to claim to have identified the actual reasons
for which God permits evils: we should always leave open the possibility that God has
other, and better, reasons for what he does than any we have been able to think of. On my
preferred account, van Inwagen-type defenses are counted as tentative proposals for theodicy. The term ‘defense’ is reserved for arguments which purport to defeat this or that argument from evil without offering a proposal concerning God’s reasons. Examples include
Plantinga’s free will defense, Plantinga’s argument against the feasibility of a probabilistic
argument from evil, the skeptical theist defense, and my own “necessity-of-gratuitousevils” defense. For discussion, see my Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God (London:
Routledge, 2004), 23–26, and The Triumph of God Over Evil: Theodicy for a World of Suffering
(Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2008), 16–21, 187–198.
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these days. If on the other hand stronger epistemic requirements are imposed, the criterion of plausibility becomes important, and the distance
between defense and theodicy narrows considerably. (What must be
evaluated, of course, is whether the defense is plausible given the truth of
theism—that is, of the particular variety of theism that is being defended.)
Now van Inwagen seems to opt for a fairly strong epistemic requirement;
he describes a defense as “a story according to which God and suffering of
the sort contained in the actual world both exist, and which is such that
(given the existence of God) there is no reason to think it false.”4 Stump, however, has in mind a weaker requirement: she states that for a defense to be
successful
it has to be the case that, for all we know5 (as distinct from all that we are
committed to believing), the claims of a defense could be true. It would therefore invalidate a defense if something about what we currently know demonstrates that the possible world of the defense is not the actual world. (454)

If ‘know’ and ‘demonstrate’ are taken strictly here, as they must be, the
requirement comes down to this: there must not be a valid deductive argument from uncontested premises to the falsity of the statements made
in the defense.6 Now such demonstrations, whether of truth or of falsity,
are very seldom available for wide-ranging philosophical claims such as
those involved in a defense against the problem of suffering. It follows
that if such a demonstration is required to invalidate a defense, then the
epistemic requirements for a successful defense are really quite weak—
but this means that the force of the defense itself will be correspondingly
weak. If no more than this is being claimed, one might wonder whether
the claim is significant enough to warrant much critical attention.
This cannot, however, be the whole story. Stump also states that if the
biblical narratives discussed in her book “are in fact divinely revealed
truth, then the defense based on those narratives will also be a theodicy.
There is nothing to keep readers committed to the belief that the biblical
texts are God’s revelation from taking the defense I construct as a theodicy” (35). Stump herself is committed to the view that the texts are God’s
revelation, so it seems clear that she also views her defense as a theodicy,
even though that is not the conclusion for which she explicitly argues in
4
From van Inwagen’s “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence,” 156 (my emphasis); cited by Stump on 19. It is worth pointing out that this explication of ‘defense’ may very well exclude the paradigmatic instance, Plantinga’s free will
defense. One could consider the free will defense to be successful, even if one thought it
extremely improbable that everyone, or indeed that anyone, actually suffers from transworld depravity. (I suppose that for Roman Catholics the idea that the virgin Mary was
transworldly depraved is actually heretical!)
5
The “for all we know” locution is also employed by van Inwagen, and I believe it tends
to encourage the sort of epistemic ambiguity noted in the text. If ‘know’ is taken strictly, the
requirement is rather weak, but the phrase is easily taken as indicating that, as in the quotation here, we have no reason for thinking the assertions to be false, which is a much stronger claim.
6
Later on Stump says, “Because it is a defense and not a theodicy, [my proposal] needs only
to be internally consistent and not incompatible with uncontested empirical evidence” (452).
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the book. But if the defense is viewed in that light, broad considerations of
probability and plausibility come into play, considerations that are apparently excluded if we consider only the “demonstrations of falsity” referred
to in the preceding paragraph.
Given this somewhat unclear situation, a decision on the part of the reviewer is called for. I submit that for a defense (in Stump’s sense) to be successful, the epistemic requirement set by van Inwagen needs to be met. That
is, it must be the case that, given the existence of God, we do not have reason to think that the assertions made in the defense are false. (If we do have
good reason to think them false, we cannot responsibly urge the defense
as showing how, in our actual world, God could be justified for permitting
suffering.) But if we have that much, the defense is at least a candidate for
being a theodicy, a true account of the reasons that God is justified in permitting suffering. For purposes of this essay, then, Stump’s defense will be
viewed as a proposal for a theodicy—as a claim, albeit a tentative one, about
what is actually the case in the world and about what may be God’s reasons
for permitting suffering.7 I do not believe this distorts her intention, even
though her official position is limited to the less ambitious claim.
The remainder of the first part is devoted to method; primarily, to justifying the use Stump intends to make of narratives. She discusses at some
length the ways in which narratives have been used in philosophy, and
argues that these approaches can legitimately be applied to biblical narratives. The main function of narratives in her approach, it turns out, is
that they provide a way of accessing “Franciscan knowledge.” Franciscan
knowledge is contrasted with Dominican knowledge, so named in virtue of what is known of the personalities of those two medieval saints.
Dominican knowledge is organized, precise, propositional knowledge—
the sort of knowledge analytic philosophy excels in presenting and processing. Franciscan knowledge, by contrast, is knowledge by immediate
experience, knowledge which, Stump argues, often cannot be translated
into propositional form. In a classic argument Frank Jackson described
Mary, a neuroscientist
who knows everything there is to know about the brain, including everything there is to know about the way in which the brain processes color,
but who has had no perceptual experience of color of any sort because from
birth she has been isolated (by some suitable villain) in a black-and-white
environment. Although, in her imprisonment, she knew all there was to
know about the neurobiology of color perception, it seems clear that she
will come to know something new when she finally perceives color. (50)

In an inspired move, Stump modifies the thought-experiment:
Imagine then that Mary in her imprisonment has had access to any and all
information about the world as long as that information is only in the form
of third-person accounts giving her knowledge that. Mary has available

7

Thus, the reference in the title to “Stump’s theodicy.”
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to her the best science texts for any of the sciences, from physics to sociology. She knows that there are other people in the world, and (mirabile
dictu) she knows all that science can teach her about them. But she has
never had any personal interactions of an unmediated and direct sort
with another person. . . . And then suppose that Mary is finally rescued
from her imprisonment and united for the first time with her mother, who
loves her deeply.
When Mary is first united with her mother, it seems indisputable that
Mary will know things she did not know before, even if she knew everything about her mother that could be made available to her in non-narrative
propositional form, including her mother’s psychological states. Although
Mary knew that her mother loved her before she met her, when she is united with her mother, Mary will learn what it is like to be loved. (52)

Mary’s newly discovered knowledge of her mother exemplifies an especially important form of Franciscan knowledge, the knowledge that is
gained through “second-person experience” of another person. (Here we
have echoes of Martin Buber’s “I-Thou” relationship.) The importance of
narrative here is that it can impart to us something similar to this even in
the absence of direct contact with the person known. Thus, in reading a
novel we may “come to know” the persons portrayed, may come to have
a sense of the heroine, say, as a person. Stump contends that in this way
the injection of narrative can counter what many have complained of as
the “aridity” and “narrowness” of analytic philosophy. (Stump identifies
herself as an analytic philosopher.) This Franciscan knowledge is what
Stump wants us to get from her biblical narratives—and also, not so incidentally, from the numerous other stories that make cameo appearances
in the various chapters of her book.
II. Worldview
The second main section sets out selected aspects of the worldview that
is assumed to be true in the world of Stump’s defense. Not surprisingly,
the worldview in question is that of the arch-Dominican, Thomas Aquinas.
First to be considered is the nature of love, which according to Aquinas has
two components: a desire for the good of the beloved, and a desire for union
with the beloved. Union, however, can take various forms, depending on
the different kinds of relationship between lover and beloved; Stump terms
these kinds of relationship the “offices of love.” She analyzes what it means
for one person to be present to another and for one person to be close to
another. She then turns to the “willed loneliness” which is an important
component in the fallen state of human beings, a loneliness which, to the
extent it prevails, shuts out from one’s life other human beings and even
God. In a chapter entitled “Other-Worldly Redemption” she describes the
divine solution to this loneliness in the form of sanctification and justification; in the process, she details her own version of the Thomistic solution to
the problems of grace and free will.
All this is done with care and insight that can hardly even be suggested
in a brief discussion such as this one. We cannot forget, to be sure, that this
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is Stump’s version of Aquinas, one that may at points disagree with other
readings of that notoriously controversial figure. Stump’s Aquinas is of
course a libertarian, unlike some other interpretations of his thought. More
surprising is the virtual disappearance of some of the divine attributes
traditionally associated with Aquinas. I found nowhere in the book any
mention of divine timeless eternity. Her descriptions of the relationships
between God and human beings are highly personalistic and interactive—
and also temporal. No doubt it would be possible to redescribe these relationships in a way that is consistent with divine timelessness. But Stump
apparently did not think it would be advantageous to her project to do so;
indeed, this might have interfered with the sense of such relationships she
was trying to communicate. There is also an interesting twist with regard
to divine impassibility. On her analysis of closeness between persons, for a
human being, Paula, to be close to God requires that God be vulnerable to
Paula. Stump is aware of the discomfort this may cause to some, but argues
that such a response would be mistaken:
But what about the condition having to do with vulnerability? On the
Thomistic conception of God as sovereign and ultimately self-sufficient, it
certainly looks as if . . . it is not possible for God to be vulnerable to human
beings. But these appearances are mistaken, too. According to a biblical
text that Aquinas accepts as literally true, God wants all human beings to
be saved, but, on a Christian doctrine Aquinas also accepts, not all human
beings are saved. . . . Because God gave human beings . . . free will, God
allowed certain things that matter to God—the salvation of all human beings—to depend on wills other than God’s own. In this sense, God makes
himself vulnerable to human beings. (123)

The traditional doctrine of divine providence as all-controlling has to go
as well. Stump’s Aquinas is not only a libertarian; he also rejects divine
middle knowledge and accepts that God takes risks in his providential
governance of the world:
Maybe God does not play dice with the universe; but perhaps, like a consummate chess master, through the application of great intelligence, he is
able to get to ends he wants through myriad possible disjunctive roads to
it. (226)

It will be left to other scholars of Aquinas to pass judgment on the attribution
to him of views such as these. I do want to say, however, that in the depiction
in these pages of God and God’s interactions with his creatures there is very
little that cannot be endorsed by the proponents of open theism.8 I say this
by way of compliment and appreciation for Stump’s views, but I am aware
that some may react less favorably!
8
Without doubt Stump’s Aquinas does hold that God is timelessly eternal, even if that
is not said here, and possesses timeless knowledge of all that transpires in time, including
what for us lies still in the future. But Stump seems on the whole to recognize that such
timeless knowledge of the future (without middle knowledge) makes no difference for divine providence and is in fact providentially useless.
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III. Narratives
The third, and longest, section of the book is devoted to the biblical narratives which are to furnish the materials for the theodicy/defense presented
in the final section. A lengthy chapter each is devoted to Stump’s comments
on the stories of Job, Samson, Abraham, and Mary of Bethany. It is clear that
she has pondered long and deeply over these narratives, and her comments
are largely based on these reflections rather than on the sorts of detailed linguistic considerations that are predominant in conventional commentaries.
In the hands of a sensitive and imaginative commentator such as Stump,
such a procedure can yield invaluable insights, and that is very much the
case here.9 However, the procedure also makes possible the intrusion of
subjective ideas that are not implied in the text and at times may even run
counter to the text. I believe this does occur in Stump’s commentaries,
though not in the same way or to the same degree in all of the chapters.
One could, to be sure, take the position that this does not matter. Stump
has pointed out that, for purposes of a defense against the problem of suffering, a fictional narrative could serve just as well as a historical account:
either one can present the character of the “world of the defense,” the
world within which God is justified in permitting the suffering. We might
add that from this standpoint it makes no difference whether the fictional
elements are present in the original story or are added by an interpreter.
But it is hardly feasible to leave it at that. Stump herself clearly wants
more than this: she devotes considerable effort to justifying her readings
and defending them against rival interpretations. And readers of the Bible
will hardly be able to consider her versions of the narratives without asking themselves how well they fit with the stories as they have come to
know them. In view of this, I offer here a few thoughts concerning her
discussions of Samson and Job.
It’s clear that many of the judgments Stump makes about the Samson
story come from outside “the world of the story.” She censures severely
Samson’s relationships with women; not without reason, to be sure. But the
text records no judgment on this, except to say that the Lord was seeking
an occasion against the Philistines. If one’s objective is to pick a fight, some
provocative actions may be called for, and Samson was always happy to
oblige! Later on, Samson’s stunt with the city gates of Gaza strikes Stump as
hubristic. But the author,10 surely, is cheering him on, as have most readers
ever since.
One of the interesting features of her treatment of the Samson narratives
is her admiration for Milton’s Samson Agonistes. This is striking because,
although both Milton and Stump empha
size Samson’s ennoblement
9
I find her comments on the story of the anointing of Jesus in Luke 7:36–50 especially
insightful (355–362). But there are many more examples.
10
In referring to “the author” I am acceding to Stump’s plea that the narrative be consid
ered as a unit; I am not taking a position concerning the literary history of the story. If in
fact it was a composite effort on the part of many hands, “the author” will be taken to designate the final editor of this part of the canonical text.
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through suffering, their readings in other respects are very different.
Stump is quite critical of Samson for his failure to make more progress in
his struggle with the Philistines; Milton’s Samson, portrayed just before
the end of his life, lays the blame for this on the Israelites who failed to rally
in support. Indeed, he apparently finds nothing of major significance to
repent of but his betrayal of the divine secret to Delilah. For Stump, in contrast, there was no secret to be betrayed, and what Samson told Delilah—
that the secret of his strength was in his long, uncut hair—was believed by
him to be false, and was in fact false, though in an odd way it came to be
true as a result of his telling her!
The turning point of the story, of course, lies precisely in that revelation,
and it is not easy to give a psychologically plausible account of the episode.
Samson had abundant evidence, based on his previous experience with
Delilah, that she would use the information to betray him, so why would
he make such a disclosure? Perhaps we can only say that he was weak, and
was sexually obsessed with Delilah, and she eventually wore him down.
It may be, also, that he irrationally believed, or half-believed, that God
would deliver him whatever he told Delilah, and whatever she might do in
consequence. Stump’s account, however, is different. On her view it simply
was not true, and was not believed by Samson to be true, that his strength
depended on his hair. His telling Delilah that was simply another in the
series of untruths with which he strung her along as she badgered him
for the secret of his strength. But in telling her what he did, knowing that
her reaction would be to cut off his hair, Samson showed contempt for his
Nazirite status, the thing that set him apart as a special servant of God.
Samson was therefore contumacious towards God, and God deserted
him as a result. This was not, however, a punishment as such, but rather
a means of securing Samson’s repentance and restoration, which came
about as a result of his terrible suffering at the hands of the Philistines.
This is certainly ingenious—too ingenious, I think, to be the intended
point of the Samson narrative, which on the whole is quite straightforward.
Virtually every reader of the story receives the impression that Samson’s
might did depend on his hair—not perhaps directly, as the result of a quasimagical causality, but rather as a condition of God’s granting to Samson his
remarkable strength. It seems clear that the reference to the regrowth of his
hair in captivity is meant to signal also the return of his strength. (Much
of the strength must indeed have returned, in order for Samson to be able
to perform his feats for the entertainment of the Philistine nobles. His final
act in pulling down the palace was a different matter, for which he needed
to ask God’s extraordinary assistance.) If Samson believed his “revelation”
to Delilah was false, why the emphasis in the text on his extreme reluctance, and the lengths to which she had to go in persuading him? (Note
Judges 16:17: “And he told her all his mind, and said to her, ‘A razor has never
come upon my head, for I have been a Nazirite from my mother’s womb. If
I be shaved, then my strength will leave me, and I shall become weak, and
be like any other man.’”)
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The final episode of the story also merits attention. According to
Stump, “He is great at the end of the story but not because he kills many
of his enemies; his renewed strength and victory over the Philistines are
by themselves hardly anything admirable in him. . . . In his praying to
God as he does then, and in the drawing-near to God that his prayer expresses, there is the culmination of the best in him. He is most glorious
in the hopeful openness with which he makes his prayer and waits for
God to flood him with strength” (255). The near-exclusive emphasis here
on Samson’s improved state vis-à-vis God, and the minimizing of the importance of his triumph over the Philistines, is contrary to the impression
received by most readers—and, I would argue, it is contrary to the view
taken by Milton, and by the text’s author.11 To be sure, Stump may not
herself greatly admire the sort of achievement involved in slaughtering
some three thousand members of an “enemy” society with a single deed.
But there may be another motive at work here as well. If Samson’s greatness, and the justification of his suffering, depended in large part on his
stupendous victory, a theodicy based on the story would have at most
extremely limited application; most of us just are not in a position to do
anything comparably spectacular.
Stump’s treatment of Job is at least equally problematic. One indication
that something is amiss is found in her complete neglect of one of the major themes of the book—the ancient version of the “prosperity gospel.”12
According to this doctrine, those who live righteously and serve the Lord
will without fail prosper, and things will go well for them. The corollary,
11
In my Bible, the account of Samson’s prayer occupies six lines; the account of his deed
is twelve lines long, culminating with the triumphant words, “So the dead whom he slew
at his death were more than those whom he had slain during his life” (Judges 16:30). As for
Milton, the answer must be found in these lines of Manoah:
Come, Come; no time for lamentation now,
Nor much more cause. Samson hath quit himself
Like Samson, and heroicly hath finished
A life heroic, on his enemies
Fully revenged—hath left them years of mourning,
And lamentation to the sons of Caphtor
Through all Philistian bounds; to Israel
Honour hath left and freedom, let but them
Find courage to lay hold on this occasion;
To himself and father’s house eternal fame;
And which is best and happiest yet, all this
With God not parted from him, as was feared
But favouring and assisting to the end. (lines 1708–1720)
Even in the final lines, where Samson’s relationship with God comes into view, the emphasis is on God’s renewed favor as shown in assisting Samson in his triumph over the Philistines.
12
Stump says that her interpretation “looks at only some parts of the book of Job, post
poning or leaving aside entirely consideration of other parts” (181). I doubt, however, that
her reading can afford to ignore such an absolutely central theme of the book.
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of course, is that anyone who suffers calamity is being punished for sin
and faithlessness. This is what motivates Job’s friends in their increasingly strident criticism of him. It is wrong to say, as Stump does, that the
comforters “abandon any objective standard of goodness in the interest
of being on the side of the ruler of the universe” (217). The comforters are
overwhelmingly concerned to affirm and defend God’s goodness, in particular his justice. That is why they are outraged at Job’s persistent denial
that he has done anything worthy of such suffering—that is, at his denial
that God’s treatment of him is just. They are mistaken, of course, but their
mistake is not aptly characterized as one of siding with sheer power and
abandoning goodness.
Many readers (and most commentators) receive the impression that Job
never receives an explanation of the reason for his suffering. Stump disagrees: he does receive such an explanation, precisely in God’s description
of his relationship with his creatures. This relationship is parental; more
precisely, it is maternal. “The imagery in [Job 38:8–11] depicts God’s dealings with the sea as maternal interactions between God and the sea. The
sea is created by coming forth from a womb, and God deals with the sea as
a mother deals with her child: he wraps it in swaddling bands; he clothes it
with a garment” (188). “‘Does the rain have a father?,’ God asks Job. ‘Who
sired the dew drops? From whose womb comes the ice[?] The hoarfrost of
heaven, who bore it . . .’ (Job 38:28–29)” (189). The ostrich “is portrayed as
an inept and foolish mother, deprived of wisdom by God. . . . There is an
implication that, if the ostrich’s eggs and children survive, this is because
God does the mother’s job for the ostrich mother” (189). The payoff for this
reading of the speeches is described by Stump as follows:
On one common moral intuition, a good parent will sometimes allow the
children she loves to suffer—but only in case the suffering confers an outweighing benefit on the child who experiences the suffering, and confers
this benefit on him in some way that could not have been equally well
achieved without the suffering. . . . Nothing in the divine speeches suggests that, when God considers what to do about the hunger of the baby
birds, he thinks primarily about what might be a good thing for the cats in
their neighborhood. God does not think about abandoning the baby birds
in their need and weakness in order to benefit some other part of the creation. . . . Rather, he considers what will be good for them, and so he feeds
them when they cry to him. (191)

Stump continues, “Nothing in God’s speeches to Job specifically describes
God’s relations with human beings, of course, but there is certainly a ready
inference—both for Job and for the audience of the book—from the way God
deals with the rest of his creation to the way in which he deals with human
persons. . . . The inference to this explanation about suffering is available to
Job” (191). So Job was after all told the reason for his suffering: not the detailed reason, of course, but he has been told that the suffering will be good
for him, will secure for him some commensurately great benefit that could
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not otherwise be obtained.13 (That benefit, according to Stump, consisted in
the transcendent greatness—the “gloriousness”—that came to Job as a result
of his faithfulness and integrity in the face of his intense suffering.)
Thus interpreted, the speech to Job contains an anticipation of Stump’s
overall defense or theodicy. What is even more striking, it seems to commit her to applying that theodicy both to animals and to human children,
something she has declined to do in her official statements. (She has stated that she is addressing only the suffering of “adult human beings who
are mentally fully functional” [4].) Perhaps mindful of this, she later on
includes a note of caution: “Although . . . God portrays himself, in general,
as concerned with the welfare of each of the animals directly, there are
occasional notes that may seem to undermine that general picture. . . .
God says he hunts the prey for the lions. But then the prey seems simply
instrumental to the well-being of the lions” (568n). It seems to me, however, that it is too late for such caution. If God permits animals to suffer
in a way that may not be conducive to their individual well-being (for instance, by becoming a lion’s breakfast), then Job has not after all been told
the reason for his suffering, as Stump has argued at some length.
But what shall we make of Stump’s interpretation? Frankly, I find little
in the text that supports the use she makes of it. (And of a number of
commentaries I’ve consulted, I find none that supports her reading.14) It’s
true that Job does not know the source of the rain, dew, and frost, but that
does not mean that God is himself the father of the rain or that God has a
womb from which the ice came forth. The young ravens cry to God, but
some of them starve to death all the same; when they don’t, their survival
is because of the death of the prey brought to them by their parents—by
their raven parents, that is, not by God. Some ostrich eggs are crushed,
though enough survive that we don’t run out of ostriches. (If the eggs
were going to be safe anyway, it wouldn’t be foolish for the mother ostrich
to neglect them.) And these facts about the seamier side of nature would
have been well known to Job. I am afraid, then, that we have to classify
Stump’s use of these passages as a case of eisegesis.
Yet another remarkable feature of Stump’s treatment is her account of
God’s conversations with Satan. The first thing to notice here is the amount
of attention they receive. In my Bible the two conversations, which occur
in the first two chapters of the book, occupy together just over one column
out of 78—about 1.5 percent of the entire text. In Stump’s 50-page chapter,
a little more than twelve and a half pages are devoted to these episodes—a
bit over 25 percent of the whole! Even viewed in the light of her statement
13
These conclusions are not, of course, stated in the text, they are (it is claimed) shown
in the relationship between God and the creatures, as depicted in God’s response to Job.
14
Her foil throughout is the Anchor Bible commentary on Job, in which she finds little
of merit. But none of a more or less random selection of commentaries I have consulted
(including Francis I. Andersen, John E. Hartley, E. P. Hoevenor, G. Gerald Janzen, Keil and
Delitzsch, The Interpreter’s Bible, and The New Interpreter’s Bible) supports Stump’s interpretation.
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that some parts of the book are being passed over, this seems disproportionate. Why, we are led to ask, this extreme emphasis on what seems only
a minor aspect of the entire text?
The answer is that part of what is seen in these episodes is God’s parental care and concern for Satan himself! They reveal the hope on God’s
part that Satan may come to acknowledge the genuine goodness of Job, an
exemplary servant of God; by doing this, Satan would abandon or at least
modify his cynical attitude towards God’s governance of the world, and
would come a step closer to the reconciliation with God that God desires.
Stump acknowledges that many would hold, on theological grounds, that
Satan is beyond all hope of redemption; however she questions whether
this is true “in the world of the story.” But even if Satan’s redemption is
impossible, he may perhaps be kept from becoming even more alienated;
anyway, a perfect love such as God’s would not abandon a wayward child
even if God is aware that genuine reconciliation is not within reach.
Frankly, I find so little in the text to support Stump’s over-ingenious
reading that I don’t think a detailed rebuttal is called for. (And once again,
the commentators offer her no support.) The reasonable view to take, I
think, is that the episodes involving Satan have the function of providing
a context for the sufferings of Job that are the main theme of the book. If
God’s relationship with Satan as such were a major concern, it is incredible that there would be no mention of Satan in the book’s conclusion.
Unless, that is, the failure to mention him indicates that God’s hopes for
him were dashed. But in that case the book of Job would be in part about
the failure of God’s good intentions concerning Satan—and that, I submit,
is about as untenable as any interpretation could be.
We have to wonder, at this point, about the reason behind Stump’s preoccupation with these apparently minor episodes. Of course the notion that
even Satan may not be beyond the possibility of redemption has attractions
of its own; attractions, however, that are most readily appreciated in the
context of a universalist narrative that Stump does not endorse. But there is
another reason in this case: the episodes as she interprets them provide crucial evidence supporting what she terms the “fractal character” of the book
of Job. A fractal pattern, as this is understood in mathematics, is one that
is scale-invariant. A fractal such as the Mandelbrot set is such that “when
any detail of the whole graph is enlarged, its graph closely resembles the
graph of the whole but is not identical to it” (220–221). Fractal patterns can
be discerned in nature to some extent; for example, the distribution of perturbations in the cosmic background radiation is said to be fractal, or scaleinvariant. And it has been claimed that the apparently random drips in the
paintings of Jackson Pollock also exhibit a fractal pattern.
As applied to the book of Job, the fractal pattern amounts to this: God’s
loving concern for Job, which includes a willingness to see him suffer for
his own greater good, is mirrored in the lives of each of the other persons
mentioned. We don’t see how this works in the case of Job’s original children: how was it to their benefit to be killed by the wind that collapsed
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the house in which they were partying? We shouldn’t expect to see this,
however; it is not their story that is being told. But for the fractal analysis
to carry conviction there has to be someone in the book other than Job
himself to whom the principles of the theodicy can be seen to apply. And
the best candidate for this “someone” is, of course, Satan:
Insofar as the details of God’s dealings with Job and also their outcome is
very similar but not identical to the details and outcome of God’s dealings
with Satan or with the non-human animals and the other parts of creation,
the book of Job seems to me the second-person analogue of a Mandelbrot
set. (221)

The notion that the book has this sort of fractal character is certainly an
attractive one. But the only substantial evidence in its favor is found in the
episodes exhibiting God’s relationship with Satan, and the interpretation of
those episodes we have been given just doesn’t stand up. I am afraid, therefore, that the source of the fractal pattern must be found in Stump herself.
I have been critical especially of Stump’s treatment of Job, but it is important to say here that her account of Job as well as of her other protagonists contains much that is insightful and valuable, especially in her
depiction of the redemptive value of Job’s second-person encounter with
God. There are, I think, flaws in the interpretation, but the flaws by no
means negate the value of the whole.
IV. Theodicy/Defense
The final section of the book consists of three chapters. In the first, she
sets forth the Thomistic theodicy that is the heart of her project, and defends it against certain objections. In the second, she addresses a topic not
considered by Aquinas: suffering that results from deprivation of “desires
of the heart,” things upon which a person’s heart is set that are not essential to the person’s ultimate flourishing, understood as “shared union
with God.” (This is one of the best and most interesting chapters in the
book, though it also poses problems for the theodicy. Unfortunately, I will
not be able to pursue this fascinating topic further in this essay.) Having
shown to her own satisfaction how the Thomistic theodicy can be enhanced so as to account for such suffering, she completes her defense of it
in the final chapter; she defends it, however, not as a theodicy but rather
as a defense, in the sense discussed earlier.15
Stump’s proposal draws upon the portrayals in the biblical narratives
of the preceding section:
15
I am not entirely clear about Stump’s reasons for preferring defense to theodicy. We
might suppose that it is because nonbelievers cannot be expected to accept the positive
theolog ical claims made in a theodicy. But this would be a bad reason: all sensible theodicists realize that their task is one of warding off objections and that theodicy as such is
not expected to provide positive grounds for belief. The only other substantive advantage I
can think of lies in the lesser epistemic requirements for a defense as she understands it. I
believe, however, that these lowered epistemic requirements constitute a weakness rather
than a strength of her project of defense.
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[T]ogether, Job, Samson, Abraham, and Mary give us an iconic representation of the panoply of human suffering. The physical pain and mental
agony of an innocent victim are pictured in the story of Job. The self-destruction of human evil is evident in the story of Samson. The heartsickness
whose source is the deprivation of a heart’s desire is portrayed in the story
of Abraham. And the misery of being unwanted, shamed, and heartbroken
is shown in the story of Mary. . . . All the modes of suffering are here, even if
many of the species are missing. (373)

These stories could be used as examples to illustrate premises in her arguments about suffering, but Stump objects that “to use the stories in this
way is to wreck them as stories” (372). She prefers to regard them as a
fund of shared experience between author and readers, as a way of accessing the “Franciscan knowledge” that the stories (it is hoped) will have
communicated.
Before engaging the central claims of Stump’s defense, it is necessary
to note certain limitations in the scope both of the defense and of the
Thomistic theodicy on which it is based. The defense does not attempt
to provide a justification for suffering which is entirely voluntary, nor for
suffering which is justly imposed as a punishment for wrongdoing; in
neither case is any further justification called for. (One might suppose that
this excludes Samson from her purview, but she thinks not: “Even if we
grant . . . that Samson is guilty of serious moral wrongdoing . . . the ruin
of Samson’s life seems out of all proportion to that wrongdoing” [380].)
There is, however, a further limitation: the theodicy applies only to
the sufferings of “mentally fully functional adult human beings”; excluded, then, are the sufferings of animals, of children, and of mentally
impaired adults. One might suppose that the fundamental principle, that
all suffering is ultimately to the benefit of the sufferer, applies in those
cases also, the difficulty being that we have less grasp of the sorts of
experiences possible for children, impaired adults, and animals. Those
difficulties do play a role here, but Stump is unwilling to commit herself
even to the basic principle: “There is no guarantee that one and only one
explanation of suffering applies to all the kinds of sufferings there are in
the world” (379).
I think this limitation is problematic for her. For one thing, it may strike
us as strange for someone to write a 650-page book on the problem of suffering, and yet exclude from consideration what may well be some of the
most difficult cases. (Are we to expect another 650, or 1300, pages that will
address those missing cases?) Furthermore, it is hard to see how the moral
principles which drove Stump to accept the basic principle as applied to
normal adults will allow her to make exceptions in the case of children
and impaired persons. We saw in her treatment of Job that an important
role is played by the intuition that “a good parent will sometimes allow
the children she loves to suffer—but only in case the suffering confers
an outweighing benefit on the child who experiences the suffering, and
confers this benefit on him in some way that could not have been equally
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well achieved without the suffering.” Would it not be strange, then, for
her to hold that God is not bound by this principle in his own treatment
of human children?
At this point, however, we need to address the central claims of the
theodicy, with respect to those cases in which it applies. These claims are
formulated by Stump in terms of a series of questions, all of which must
receive an affirmative answer for the theodicy to succeed. The two questions that are germane for the present discussion are initially stated as
follows:16
(C a1) Does God’s allowing a person’s suffering enable her to flourish?
(C a2) Is a person’s suffering the best available means, in the circumstances, for her to flourish? (456)
These questions, however, need to be reformulated in terms of Aquinas’s
scale of values, according to which human flourishing consists ultimately
in “shared union with God.” So reformulated, we have
(C A1) Does God’s allowing a person’s suffering enable her to be willing to let God be close to her?
(C A2) Is a person’s suffering the best available means, in the circumstances, to enable her to be willing to let God be close to her?
(456)
Let me say here that I don’t think we should forget entirely the first version of the questions. It may be true that shared union with God is the
most important thing, but it would distort our view of human life if we
were to ignore all the other things that are ingredients in what we normally consider to be a person’s flourishing. (Stump’s actual procedure is
consistent with this; she does consider goods other than union with God.)
The “best available means” language also calls for comment. The “best
available means” are those means which, in the light of the existing circumstances, are most likely to bring about the desired result, given that
the actual results, which depend on the free response of the sufferer, cannot be known prior to the decision to employ those means. The purpose,
then, of the “best means” language, and also that of the word “enable,” is
to allow for cases in which, due to the free will of the sufferer, the good
results God intends in allowing the suffering do not in fact come about.
Now for determinists and Molinists, who hold that God knows, prior to
his decision to allow the suffering, exactly what the results will be, the
issue of “best available means” (in this sense) arguably does not arise.
God in permitting the suffering is choosing to bring about precisely those
results which will actually ensue. But with Stump’s open-theist-like view
of providence, God does not know this prior to his decision to allow the
16
In addition to the two questions discussed here, there are two more dealing with the
“desires of the heart.” As noted above, this topic will not be addressed in this essay.
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suffering,17 so all that can be expected is that God should choose the best
available means to the desired result.
Stump holds that these questions can and should receive an affirmative answer. I believe there are serious problems for her position, both of
a broadly empirical and of a conceptual nature. She makes an attempt to
address both sorts of problems, but not, I think, successfully. First, the empirical problem. Let me say at the outset that I accept completely that suffering can, and sometimes does in fact, have the sorts of beneficial results
she contemplates. The problem, as I see it, consists in the many, many
cases in which no such results are evident—in which it seems that the
actual results are quite the opposite. In order to highlight this problem, I
think a further reformulation is called for, one that brings out more forcefully the universality of what is being claimed:
(C A1)* Does God’s allowing a person’s suffering in every case enable
her to be willing to let God be close to her?
(C A2)* Is a person’s suffering in every case the best available means,
in the circumstances, to enable her to be willing to let God be
close to her?
In support of affirmative answers to (C A1) and (C A2), Stump cites
scientific studies concerning “post-traumatic growth,” in which various
researchers have verified empirically that extreme trauma does in fact
produce unexpected personal growth, including growth in religious and
spiritual awareness. This research is impressive, and provides valuable
backup for the anecdotal evidence for the same conclusion. The research,
however, supports affirmative answers to what we might term the existentially quantified versions of (C A1) and (C A2); it does little to vindicate
the universally quantified versions needed by the theodicy. The real difficulty, then, concerns the all-too-numerous cases in which no result of the
desired sort can be seen to occur—rather, the sufferer becomes embittered,
or unable to function, or perhaps just limps through life in what appears to
be a permanently compromised condition. The scientific data are far from
providing unambiguous support for Stump’s position. A major concern
stemming from the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is the number of
returning veterans who suffer from untreated, or inadequately treated, posttraumatic stress disorder. Mental health professionals who are concerned
about this do not suppose that the solution lies in waiting for the expected
post-traumatic growth to become manifest! The point concerning “best
possible means” provides only limited help. In very many cases, surely,
it is highly predictable that severe suffering is unlikely to produce positive
results.18 At this point I will make my appeal to one of my own favorite
17
What is at issue here is, of course, priority in the order of explanation, not temporal
priority, which for a timeless God cannot exist.
18
The emphasis on the free will of the sufferer as the explanation for an unfavorable
result has a downside of its own: it implies that, when suffering fails to have a beneficial
effect, this is invariably the sufferer’s own fault.
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theodicists, Austin Farrer, who wrote, “Good, even animal good, such as
physical health or a moderate plenty, is a more fertile breeder of good on the
whole—yes, even of moral good—than evil of any kind can be.”19
At this point Stump is likely to say—in fact, she does say—that “neither
suffering nor the benefits defeating suffering are transparent” (413), so
that in many cases the apparent lack of beneficial results from suffering
may be only apparent, and misleading to us who do not know the secret
recesses of the heart. The point is well taken, but it cuts both ways. It may
also be the case that some who appear to us to have coped reasonably well
are in fact deeply embittered, or have lost all hope, even though they are
able to maintain a plausible front to others. Our lack of insight into the
hearts of people should make us cautious in judging individual cases, but
it has no tendency to show that things overall are better rather than worse
than they appear to us to be.20
The sorts of claims made by Stump may seem hard to refute when we
consider individual cases of suffering that come to people from time to
time. It may be, we think, that for some special reason, unknown to us,
these particular persons are especially suited to deal with such trials and
to benefit from them—at least, it is difficult to prove otherwise. The situation becomes far more grave, however, when we consider natural or manmade disasters which suddenly and in an undiscriminating fashion bring
great suffering upon nearly every individual in an affected area. Are we to
suppose, in such cases, that for every such individual there is a particular
reason why he or she was selected for such suffering? It must be the case
that each one of them, without exception, would benefit at least as much
from this disaster as from anything else that could have happened to
them. And if this is so for each of them, then presumably it is so for each of
us as well. (I scarcely think Stump would want to say that catastrophes occur because they are particularly appropriate to the needs of the persons
in the affected area.)21 Occurrences bringing sudden death22 on a massive
scale (such as the recent tsunami in Japan) must also be considered. If all
such deaths are beneficial to those who perish, it must be the case that,
for nearly all of us nearly all of the time, sudden death with little or no
time for preparation would be more conducive to a happy afterlife than
would whatever years of life might remain to us in the absence of such a
disaster.23 And that is a hard doctrine to swallow. I believe therefore, that,
Austin Farrer, Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited (London: Collins, 1962), 167.
Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1998), 27–28.
21
Paul Reasoner has pointed out to me that the same problem arises in relation to doctrines of karma; it is implausible to suppose that the same karmic outcomes are appropriate
to each of a large, randomly selected group of individuals.
22
Death also, even painless death, counts as suffering on Stump’s extended notion of
suffering; see p. 5.
23
Hamlet (Act III, Scene IV) decided not to kill the murderer of his father while the man
was at prayer, lest he do the villain a favor by sending him to heaven with his soul purged
19

20
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evaluating the claims made in Stump’s defense in terms of van Inwagen’s
requirements for a successful defense, we have good reason to think the defense is false. If Stump should reply that I have not demonstrated that it is
false based on uncontested empirical evidence, I will readily agree. But I
will add this: if she thinks that is good enough, she is too easily satisfied.
The conceptual problem is at least equally serious. Stump introduces
this by saying, “someone might complain that on Aquinas’s views we
ought never to try to alleviate suffering since to alleviate suffering would
also be to prevent the benefit brought about by the suffering” (412).24 She
responds that “one person Paula’s allowing some suffering on the part
of another person Jerome that Paula could readily prevent or relieve is
morally permissible only if Paula is justified in holding the true belief
that suffering is the best means in the circumstances for drawing Jerome
closer to God in the process of justification or sanctification” (413).25 But
human beings are very rarely in a position to know anything like this.
Stump notes, however, that “The putative objector might rejoin here that
the possession of a Thomistic theodicy in effect provides what one might
otherwise not have—namely, the basis for concluding that any particular
suffering will in fact serve the purpose of justification and sanctification.
. . . And so . . . a Thomistic theodicy provides what I have just claimed human beings rarely have: moral justification for permitting the suffering of
others” (413). She replies,
But this rejoinder is also confused. On Aquinas’s theodicy, any particular
suffering allowed by God will benefit others in the way the theodicy explains.
But when Paula considers whether she ought to try to prevent or relieve Jerome’s suffering, she cannot know whether the future suffering of Jerome
that she is considering is suffering that God will allow. That is because, if
Paula does not do what she can to alleviate that future suffering of Jerome’s,
someone else might do so. (413)

Two comments are in order here. First of all, there are plenty of circumstances in which we have good reason to believe that, if we fail to act or
prevent or alleviate suffering, no one else will do so. The women who, in
the nineteenth century, were denied anesthesia because Providence had
ordained that childbirth should be painful (Stump’s example) were not
of guilt. In truth, the prospects for Hamlet’s revenge were worse than he feared: whenever
he might slay his enemy, he will make the man’s chances of escaping damnation better than
had he enjoyed more years of life. This is bad news for those intent on murderous revenge,
but bad news also for all of us, whose lives on this view represent mainly a relentless downward spiral of spiritual decline.
24
Stump attributes this objection to me, referencing The Triumph of God Over Evil, 189–191.
I do not, however, affirm the objection precisely in the way she formulates it, nor do I agree
with some of the other views she attributes to her objector. Conclusions about my views
need to be formed on the basis of what is actually said in my book, as well as in this essay.
25
Surely this cannot be true; it’s obvious, as I think Stump would admit, that other benefits (such as restoring Jerome to health) might justify Paula’s permitting his suffering (for
instance, if she has medical power of attorney and can decide whether or not to permit serious and painful surgery to be performed on him).
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relieved of their pains in some other way. Very often, those who suffer from
natural disasters simply will not be helped, if we don’t help them. And
there are many situations of this sort. But second, if Paula does not prevent
Jerome’s suffering but someone else does, then Paula will not have permitted Jerome to suffer at all. In fact, from the standpoint of Jerome’s welfare,
Paula’s decision not to intervene is a “fail-safe” option: if the suffering does
occur, it will be because it is the best possible means to Jerome’s ultimate
welfare; otherwise, he simply will not suffer. I am not claiming that it would
be morally wrong for Paula to intervene, but it is impossible to deny that if
she does intervene, this will not enhance Jerome’s ultimate welfare and may very
well detract from it. If she knows that Aquinas’s theodicy is true, she knows
this as well; it follows, that if she nevertheless ought to intervene, the reason
she ought to do so has nothing to do with Jerome’s welfare.
This does not, of course, entail that Paula ought not to care about Jerome’s
suffering. It is right and appropriate that she should care deeply about it,
but her caring may not and should not be the sole determinant of what she
should do. She will be in a situation comparable to one discussed several
times by Stump: a parent has a sick child, and the best chances of recovery
lie in a treatment which will be excruciatingly painful for the child. If she
does not allow the treatment, the child may not recover from the illness,
but if she does allow it, she will suffer along with (and perhaps even more
than) the child. I submit that it is intolerable to suppose that we are always
or nearly always in such a situation when we contemplate the opportunity
to relieve or prevent serious suffering on the part of others. To suppose this
creates a certain sort of conceptual incoherence in a religious worldview
that urges us to be ready in our response to those who are suffering, yet
also informs us that if we prevent or relieve their suffering we are very
likely harming their most important interests.26
In a hedonistic society such as ours, it takes courage as well as wisdom
and resource to write a book extolling the redemptive benefits of suffering. Stump has performed this daunting task with great distinction. I’ve
argued that some of her claims cannot be sustained, but this in no way
negates the value of the materials she has assembled. The book ought to
be read by everyone with an interest in the topic; it may even bring light
to some who wander in darkness (and that is many of us, at one time or
another). I do not think we can learn from her the solution to the problem
of suffering. But that may be because a solution of the kind she is looking
for is simply not available.27
Huntington University
26
Ironically, the objection to Stump’s theodicy at this point parallels a very similar objection to the skeptical theist position: skeptical theists are obliged to hold that we have no
knowledge whatsoever, with respect to any particular action we may choose to perform,
whether that action is likely to make the world better or worse overall. See my “All Too
Skeptical Theism,” International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 68 (2010), 15–29.
27
My thanks to Thomas Flint, Paul Reasoner, and Charles Taliaferro for valuable comments on an earlier version of this material.

